23 ClawHub Plugins Found Impersonating Official @openclaw and @clawhub Namespaces
AI relevance: ClawHub plugins execute directly within AI agents like Claude Code and Cursor with system-level privileges — namespace impersonation creates a false trust surface that enables future supply chain compromise.
- Manifold Security identified 23 plugins on ClawHub improperly using official organizational namespaces (
@openclaw/and@clawhub/scopes) by third-party accounts with no connection to those organizations. - ClawHub indexes over 1,500 plugins for AI agents including Claude Code and Cursor. Of 1,508 plugins, 557 used an
@owner/scope, but many were never verified as owned. - Flagged plugins used names like
@openclaw/security-gateand@clawhub/prediction-market, appearing as genuine first-party integrations. - One account controlled five different
@clawhub/packages, suggesting either coordinated squatting or opportunistic namespace parking. - Manually reviewed by Manifold Security — no malicious code found in current versions. However, the high-privilege actions these plugins are authorized to perform create latent risk.
- Reported to ClawHub on June 17, 2026. Plugins unlisted by June 19. ClawHub updated documentation with formal dispute process for organizational scopes.
- This follows prior research uncovering AI skills exfiltrating data or secretly recruiting agents into cryptocurrency swarms.
Why it matters
Scope squatting transforms a security feature (namespace verification) into a liability. Unlike npm's strict enforcement, ClawHub's documentation outlined scope rules but didn't comprehensively enforce them. An attacker could inherit the default credibility of an official namespace, publish a seemingly legitimate plugin, and wait for widespread adoption before introducing malicious updates.
What to do
- Audit installed ClawHub plugins for any using
@openclaw/or@clawhub/scopes — verify publisher legitimacy. - Organizations owning brands/scopes should submit formal disputes to reclaim squatted handles.
- Implement plugin allowlists rather than installing ad-hoc from registries.
- Review plugin permissions and sandbox execution where possible.
- Monitor for unexpected plugin updates that could introduce malicious code.